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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Sebastian Richardson, a former inmate at 
the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, is seeking 
both individual monetary damages for alleged violations 
of his constitutional rights at USP Lewisburg and class-
wide injunctive relief to prevent future constitutional 
violations at the penitentiary.  While the procedural 
history of this case is complex, we are presented with a 
single issue on appeal.  We must determine whether 
Richardson’s class-wide claims for injunctive relief are 
moot because Richardson was transferred out of USP 
Lewisburg after he filed an amended class action 
complaint but before he moved for class certification. 
 We conclude that Richardson’s class claims are 
not moot.  As we have previously held, when individual 
claims for relief are acutely susceptible to mootness, a 
would-be class representative may, in some 
circumstances, continue to seek class certification after 
losing his personal stake in the case.  Additionally, even 
though Richardson never filed a motion for class 
certification, we hold that the class certification issue was 
clearly presented to the District Court both in 
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Defendants’ motion to dismiss Richardson’s amended 
class complaint and in Richardson’s response to that 
motion.  Richardson’s claims, therefore, relate back to 
the date on which he filed his amended class action 
complaint.  Accordingly, he may continue to seek class 
certification in this case.  We will therefore remand this 
case to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
 Sebastian Richardson arrived at USP Lewisburg in 
March 2010 and was immediately placed in the Special 
Management Unit program (SMU program).  The SMU 
program was created to house inmates with special 
security concerns, namely individuals with past histories 
of violence and individuals who “participated in or had 
leadership roles in geographical groups/gang related 
activity.”  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Program Statement: 
Special Management Units, P5217.01, § 1 (Nov. 19, 
2008), available at 
https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5217_001.pdf.  
Upon entering the SMU program, inmates are 
interviewed to determine their “separation needs and 
known enemies” so that they are not placed with 
incompatible individuals.  Richardson v. Kane, No. 
3:CV-11-2266, 2013 WL 1452962, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 
9, 2013).  Once in the program, inmates are rotated 
between cells every twenty-one days, sometimes 
receiving new cellmates as they rotate.  Id. 
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 Richardson’s amended complaint alleges that 
through a “pattern, practice or policy,” Pl.’s Am. Compl. 
2, ECF No. 21, officials at USP Lewisburg frequently 
placed inmates in cells with hostile cellmates, 
unnecessarily increasing the risk of inmate-on-inmate 
violence.  Id. at 10-11.  He further alleges that if an 
inmate refused to accept a hostile cellmate, he would be 
placed in painful restraints as a form of punishment.  Id. 
at 12.  Richardson claims that he was subjected to this 
policy and that it violated his Fifth and Eighth 
Amendment rights.   
 In support of this claim, Richardson explains 
how—after seven months of living with a compatible 
cellmate—corrections staff asked him to “cuff up” on the 
cell door so that a new inmate could be transferred into 
his cell.  Id. at 19.  Richardson alleges that this inmate, 
known among the prison population as “the Prophet,” 
had attacked over twenty former cellmates.  Id.  
Richardson refused to “cuff up” because he did not want 
to be placed with “the Prophet.”  Corrections staff then 
asked if Richardson was refusing his new cellmate, and 
he replied that he was.  Id.  After taking “the Prophet” 
away, corrections staff returned thirty minutes later with 
a Use of Force team and asked Richardson if he would 
submit to the use of restraints.  Richardson complied.  Id. 
 Richardson was then taken down to a laundry 
room where he was stripped, dressed in paper clothes, 
and put in “hard” restraints.  Id. at 20.  Next, he was 
 6 
 
locked in a cell with another prisoner (who was also in 
hard restraints) and left there for three days before being 
transferred yet again.  Id.  All told, Richardson alleges 
that he was held in hard restraints for nearly a month, 
was forced to sleep on the floor for much of that time, 
and frequently was refused both showers and bathroom 
breaks.  Richardson also claims that there have been at 
least 272 reports of inmate-on-inmate violence at USP 
Lewisburg between January 2008 and July 2011 and that 
dozens of other inmates have suffered treatment similar 
to his as a result of this unwritten practice or policy.  Id. 
at 10. 
 While still in the SMU program at USP 
Lewisburg, Richardson brought suit against a number of 
prison officials alleging that this unwritten policy 
violated his constitutional rights.  Richardson’s amended 
complaint seeks individual monetary damages and class-
wide injunctive relief for “[a]ll persons who are currently 
or will be imprisoned in the SMU program at USP 
Lewisburg.”  Id. at 33. 
 Richardson’s amended complaint notes that he is 
seeking class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(2), which generally provides for only 
injunctive relief.1  It also explains why such relief should 
                                                 
1 We need not weigh in on “whether there are any forms 
of ‘incidental’ monetary relief that are consistent with the 
interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2),” because Richardson has 
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be granted and discusses the specific Rule 23 factors 
courts must consider when determining whether to certify 
a class.  Id. at 41-44.  The District Court, however, found 
Richardson’s class definition “untenable because it [wa]s 
not objectively, reasonably ascertainable.”  Kane, 2013 
WL 1452962, at *4.  Certification was therefore denied.  
While this did not prevent Richardson from pursuing his 
individual claims for damages against the Defendants, 
the District Court eventually stayed Richardson’s case in 
its entirety pending this Court’s resolution of Shelton v. 
Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554 (3d Cir. 2015).  In Shelton, we 
granted a motion for interlocutory appeal of the same 
issue that was decided by the District Court here: the 
ascertainability of an identically defined class of 
prisoners at USP Lewisburg.  We held that 
ascertainability is not required for Rule 23(b)(2) classes 
and therefore remanded the case to the District Court to 
“consider whether the properly-defined putative class 
meets the remaining Rule 23 requirements for class 
certification.”  Id. at 565. 
 After we decided Shelton, Richardson sought leave 
to appeal the District Court’s denial of class certification 
in his case.  A motions panel of this Court granted the 
request.  This case, then, raises substantive issues nearly 
                                                                                                             
not sought such incidental monetary relief in this case.  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366 
(2011). 
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identical to those we considered in Shelton.  Indeed, 
Richardson argues that Shelton controls our decision in 
this case and that we should reverse the District Court’s 
order denying class certification and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with Shelton. 
 Defendants disagree.  While they admit that 
Shelton would control the outcome of Richardson’s class 
action claims, they argue that these claims have become 
moot for two reasons.  First, they argue that because 
Richardson’s individual claims for injunctive relief are 
moot, he cannot represent a class seeking the same 
injunctive relief.  Specifically, because Richardson was 
not housed in the SMU when the District Court denied 
class certification, they argue that he does “not have 
standing to represent a class of USP Lewisburg inmates 
housed in the SMU.”  Appellees’ Br. 10.  Second, 
Defendants note that all the individuals Richardson 
named as defendants have since retired or changed jobs.  
Defendants argue that this moots Richardson’s claims for 
injunctive relief because they read the amended 
complaint to allege harms resulting only from conduct 
that is personal to the individual defendants (as opposed 
to conduct that is systematic and institutional in nature).  
Accordingly, Defendants assert that Richardson’s claims 
for injunctive relief are moot under Spomer v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 514 (1974), as there is no reason to believe the 
allegedly unconstitutional conduct will continue under 
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the new prison administration.  Appellees’ Br. 11.  We 
address these two arguments in turn.2 
II. 
 Defendants argue that Richardson’s class action 
claims are moot because Richardson failed to move for 
class certification before he was transferred out of USP 
Lewisburg.  While Richardson, of course, still has 
standing to seek damages for any past constitutional 
violations that occurred while he was housed in the SMU 
program at USP Lewisburg, he must have separate 
standing for forward-looking, injunctive relief.  Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must 
demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief 
sought.”).  To determine whether Richardson has 
standing to seek injunctive relief, we ask whether he can 
“show that he is likely to suffer future injury from the 
defendant’s conduct.”  McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 
F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  Typically, “[i]n the class action 
context, [this] requirement must be satisfied by at least 
one named plaintiff.”  Id.  While it is clear that 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(e) as a result of Richardson’s petition for 
interlocutory appeal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, which was granted on July 30, 2015. 
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Richardson had standing to seek injunctive relief when 
he filed his amended complaint (as he was still housed in 
the SMU program at USP Lewisburg), we must ask 
whether his claims for injunctive relief are now moot 
because he is no longer housed there.3  Generally 
speaking, a case will become moot “when . . . the parties 
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”  U.S. 
Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Mootness jurisprudence characterizes this as “the 
personal stake requirement.”  Id. 
 The Supreme Court in Geraghty, however, noted 
that Article III mootness is more “flexible” than other 
justiciability requirements, especially in the context of 
class action litigation.  Id. at 400.  Indeed, we have 
recognized that “[i]n the class action context, special 
mootness rules apply” for determining at what point in 
time a named plaintiff must still have a personal stake in 
the litigation to continue seeking to represent a putative 
class action.  Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 
343 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 These special mootness rules have evolved over 
time to allow a plaintiff to continue seeking class 
certification in certain circumstances even though his 
                                                 
3 Richardson was transferred out of USP Lewisburg on 
September 10, 2012, a mere six weeks after he filed his 
amended complaint. 
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individual claim for relief has become moot.  One such 
special rule is commonly referred to as the “relation back 
doctrine.”  See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11 
(1975) (“[W]hether the certification can be said to ‘relate 
back’ to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the 
circumstances of the particular case and especially the 
reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade 
review.”).  This doctrine permits courts to relate a would-
be class representative’s (now moot) claim for relief back 
in time to a point at which that plaintiff still had a 
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.  The 
plaintiff can thus continue to represent, or seek to 
represent, a class of similarly situated persons despite no 
longer having a justiciable claim for individual relief.  
See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 
(1991) (“‘[T]he termination of a class representative’s 
claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members 
of the class.’” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
110 n.11 (1975))). 
 For example, courts have often recognized that the 
relation back doctrine applies to claims that are 
“inherently transitory” or “capable of repetition yet 
evading review.”  See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 46; 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398-99; N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985).  
Such cases can still be heard in federal court even if the 
named plaintiff’s claims have become moot during the 
litigation.  Here, however, we consider a different 
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application of the relation back doctrine: the picking off 
exception to mootness. 
A. 
 In Weiss v. Regal Collections, we held that when a 
plaintiff’s individual claim for relief is “acutely 
susceptible to mootness” by the actions of a defendant, 
that plaintiff may continue to represent the class he is 
seeking to certify even if his individual claim has been 
mooted by actions of the defendant.  385 F.3d 337, 347-
48 (3d Cir. 2004).  This has colloquially been termed the 
“picking off” exception to mootness.  See Wilson v. 
Gordon, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 2957155, at *9 (6th Cir. 
May 23, 2016).  Because Weiss (the only case in this 
Circuit to recognize the picking off exception) was 
partially overruled by the Supreme Court in Campbell-
Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016), we find it 
necessary to reexamine the basis for this exception to 
determine whether this holding in Weiss is still good law.  
We will therefore trace the development of the picking 
off exception and explain why we conclude that it has 
survived Campbell-Ewald. 
 We find one of the first invocations of the picking 
off exception in White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 857 (2d 
Cir. 1977).  Here, plaintiff George White alleged that the 
Social Security Administration delayed processing 
numerous disability claims in violation of the Social 
Security Act.  However, because the Administration had 
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processed White’s claim while his class certification 
motion was pending, the court had to determine whether 
the mooting of his individual claim mooted the entire 
class action.  Id.  The court first recognized that if it did 
not relate White’s claim back to the date on which he 
sought class certification, the Social Security 
Administration “could avoid judicial scrutiny of its 
procedures by the simple expedient of granting hearings 
to plaintiffs who seek, but have not yet obtained, class 
certification.”  Id.  While White did “not suggest that this 
occurred here,”  it explained that it must take into 
account “the ‘reality’ of that possibility in the future.”  
Id.  Accordingly, the court held that White’s claim could 
relate back to the date he sought class certification, thus 
preventing mootness.  Id.  
 Of note, White also recognized that the district 
court could have ruled on the motion to certify more 
quickly if it “had been concerned about mootness.”  Id.  
But it also concluded that “a district court should have 
enough time to consider these important issues of class 
status carefully, particularly when no purpose would be 
served by rushing a ruling.”  Id.  This timing issue will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 While White first recognized the logic of the 
picking off exception, it was not until the following year 
that this exception was expanded to permit relation 
back—not just to the date of the motion for class 
certification, but to the date of the class complaint.  In 
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Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW,  all the named 
plaintiffs received complete relief (in the form of 
expedited review of their disability claims) before they 
moved for class certification.  587 F.2d 329, 333 (6th Cir. 
1978).  This, the defendants argued, mooted the entire 
class action.  The Sixth Circuit disagreed.  It recognized 
that the plaintiffs’ claims 
epitomize[d] the type of claim which 
continually evades review if [they are] 
declared moot merely because the 
defendants have voluntarily ceased the 
illegal practice complained of in the 
particular instance.  Thus, the defendants 
may expedite processing for any plaintiffs 
named in a suit while continuing to allow 
long delays with respect to all other 
applicants. 
Id.  The court was concerned by the use of these tactics 
because they seemed to give the defendants the ability to 
exploit a loophole that would, in some cases, prevent 
class certification indefinitely.  As Blankenship 
recognized, if defendants were allowed to “pick off” 
would-be class representatives, the defendants might be 
able to ensure “that no remedy could ever be provided for 
continuing abuses.”  Id.  Every time someone filed a 
complaint and sought class status, the defendants could, 
as they did in Blankenship, expedite review of that 
plaintiff’s disability claim and prevent that person from 
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becoming a class representative.  Id.  Requiring such 
piecemeal litigation would undermine the very purpose 
of class action litigation.  Thus, Blankenship held that 
even if the would-be class representative’s claim became 
moot, “the class members retain[ed] a live interest in 
th[e] case so that the class action should not be declared 
moot, and the class certification should ‘relate back’ to 
the date of the filing of the complaint.”  Id. 
 Two years later, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
this same practical concern and recognized that “[t]o 
deny the right to appeal simply because the defendant has 
sought to ‘buy off’ the individual private claims of the 
named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound judicial 
administration.”  Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, 
Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).  In Roper, 
however, the Supreme Court did not have to decide 
whether the relation back doctrine could be used to relate 
a claim back to the date on which a plaintiff filed a class 
complaint, as opposed to the class certification motion, 
because the named plaintiff’s claim became moot only 
after the denial of class certification was appealed.  Thus, 
the Court held only that the named plaintiff’s loss of a 
personal stake in the litigation while appealing the class 
certification issue did not prevent him from continuing to 
seek to represent the class.  That being said, for the 
reasons discussed below, we agree with the Sixth Circuit 
that there is “no distinction between picking off a named 
plaintiff when a motion for class certification has been 
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filed and is then pending and picking off a named 
plaintiff after the motion for class certification has been 
denied.”  Wilson, __ F.3d at __, 2016 WL 2957155, at 
*10.  In other words, while the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Roper is limited in scope, we believe its logic extends 
more broadly.  
 Indeed, just a year after Roper was decided, the 
Fifth Circuit came to the same conclusion.  The court 
held that the picking off exception permits application of 
the relation back doctrine even when the District Court 
has not yet ruled on the issue of class certification: 
By tendering to the named plaintiffs the full 
amount of their personal claims each time 
suit is brought as a class action, the 
defendants can in each successive case moot 
the named plaintiffs’ claims before a 
decision on certification is reached.  A series 
of individual suits, each brought by a new 
named plaintiff, could individually be 
“picked off” before class certification; as a 
practical matter, therefore, a decision on 
class certification could, by tender to 
successive named plaintiffs, be made . . . 
difficult to procure . . . . 
Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 
1050 (5th Cir. 1981).  In support of this position, the 
court cited several cases that “have considered the effect 
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of a defendant governmental agency’s voluntary 
performance of a specific action demanded in the 
lawsuit.”  Id. at 1051.  It concluded that “[i]n each of 
these cases the court has held that the defendant could 
not prevent a decision on the plaintiff’s motion for 
certification by rendering the individual plaintiff’s 
demand for injunctive relief moot before the court has 
reasonably been able to consider the motion.”  Id.  The 
above cases thus highlight the development of and 
rationale for the picking off exception to mootness.  
 All this brings us back to Weiss.  We held in Weiss 
that a would-be class representative can continue to seek 
class certification even after losing his personal stake in 
the litigation if the claims raised are “acutely susceptible 
to mootness.”  385 F.3d at 347 (internal citations 
omitted).  We also held that this picking off exception to 
mootness would permit us to relate a claim for relief back 
to the date the would-be class representative filed his 
class action complaint, not just to the date of the class 
certification decision (as the Supreme Court did in 
Roper).  Id. at 348. 
 Indeed, Weiss noted that while “most of the cases 
applying the relation back doctrine have done so after a 
motion to certify has been filed[,] . . . reference to the 
bright line event of the filing of the class certification 
motion may not be well-founded.”  Id. at 347 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  We explained 
that a bright line rule was not consistent with the general 
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principle that “the class action process should be able to 
‘play out’ according to the directives of Rule 23 and 
should permit due deliberation by the parties and the 
court on the class certification issues.”  Id. at 348.  That 
being said, Weiss also recognized that the picking off 
exception was still limited.  For example, Weiss 
explained that relation back is not appropriate if the 
plaintiff “undu[ly] delay[s]” raising the issue of class 
certification.  Id. 
 A brief discussion of the facts in Weiss helps make 
the reasoning behind this approach clear.  Richard Weiss 
filed suit against Regal Collections on behalf of himself 
and a putative nationwide class of similarly situated 
individuals alleging that Regal Collections’ debt 
collection practices violated the Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act (FDCPA).  Id. at 339.  Weiss sought 
monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.  Id. at 339-
41.  In response, and a mere “six weeks after plaintiff 
filed his amended complaint,”  id. at 348 n.18, Regal 
Collections made a Rule 68 offer to Weiss in the amount 
of $1000 plus attorney fees, the full amount available 
under the FDCPA.  Id. at 339-40.  This offer came before 
Weiss had moved for class certification, and did not 
provide for any injunctive, declaratory, or class-wide 
relief.  Recognizing that class action mootness principles 
may not always track those of individual claims for 
relief, Weiss held that Regal Collections’ Rule 68 offer 
mooted Weiss’s individual claim for relief, but further 
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held that this did not prevent Weiss from continuing to 
seek class certification as a would-be class 
representative.  In other words, Weiss’s loss of a personal 
stake in the litigation did not moot the case.  
 We concluded that if Regal Collections’ offer of 
relief to Weiss could moot the entire class action, “it 
would encourage a race to pay off named plaintiffs very 
early in the litigation, before they file motions for class 
certification.”  Id. at 348 n.19 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  This would “encourage premature 
certification decisions,” id. at 347, and undermine the 
import of Rule 23(c)(1)(a), which now states that 
certification decisions should be made “at an early 
practicable time,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(a), instead of 
“as soon as practicable after commencement of an 
action.”  Id. advisory committee notes to 2003 
amendment.  This change reflects the view of the 
Advisory Committee that there are “many valid reasons 
that may justify deferring the initial certification 
decision.”  Id. 
  Twelve years after Weiss, the Supreme Court took 
up an issue that had been bedeviling courts across the 
country: whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer could moot 
an individual plaintiff’s claim for relief.  As mentioned 
above, we held in Weiss that a Rule 68 offer did moot the 
individual claim for relief, but we also held that the 
would-be class representative still had an interest in 
seeking class certification and thus the case was not 
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moot.  The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with our 
first holding, and instead explained that “an unaccepted 
settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a 
plaintiff’s case . . . .”  Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 672.  
This meant that someone in Weiss’s position still had a 
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation even 
though he was offered complete relief under Rule 68.  
The Supreme Court, therefore, did not need to reach the 
arguably more difficult question: whether a named 
plaintiff who did in fact lack a personal stake in the 
outcome of the litigation could continue to seek class 
certification even though his claim became moot before 
filing a motion for class certification. 
 Accordingly, as we have already recognized, 
“Campbell-Ewald overrules our previous holding in 
Weiss that ‘[a]n offer of complete relief will generally 
moot the plaintiff’s claim, as at that point the plaintiff 
retains no personal interest in the outcome of the 
litigation.’”  Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 819 F.3d 
61, 64 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340).  
However, Campbell-Ewald did not address the picking 
off exception.  Doing so was clearly unnecessary under 
Campbell-Ewald’s logic.  Accordingly, we do not read 
Campbell-Ewald to overrule Weiss’s holding regarding 
the picking off exception to mootness. 
 Nor do we read Campbell-Ewald to answer the 
question posed in this case.  Richardson’s individual 
claim for injunctive relief is still moot.  Richardson was 
 21 
 
transferred out of USP Lewisburg before he filed any 
documents other than his amended class action 
complaint.  Because of this transfer, Richardson’s 
personal stake in the claims for injunctive relief was 
extinguished.4  We therefore will apply the picking off 
exception just as we did in Weiss to determine whether 
Richardson may continue to represent the class of 
                                                 
4 Richardson has not carried his burden of showing that 
he fits into either the “capable of repetition yet evading 
review” or the “inherently transitory” exceptions to 
mootness.  Specifically, Richardson has not shown that 
he has a reasonable expectation of being placed in the 
SMU Program again in the future, nor has he shown that 
the amount of time an inmate spends in the SMU 
Program is typically so brief as to evade review by 
becoming moot before a District Court can rule on class 
certification.  Cf. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 
at 31 (“Thus, a matter is not necessarily moot simply 
because the order attacked has expired; if the underlying 
dispute between the parties is one ‘capable of repetition, 
yet evading review,’ it remains a justiciable controversy 
within the meaning of Article III.”); Lusardi v. Xerox 
Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 981 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Some claims 
are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not 
have even enough time to rule on a motion for class 
certification before the proposed representative’s 
individual interest expires.” (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 
399)). 
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inmates still being held in the SMU Program at USP 
Lewisburg despite the mootness of his individual claim.5 
 Next, we briefly analyze a few post-Weiss cases 
which further support the continued use of the picking off 
exception and help to clarify its scope.  Specifically, we 
look at when this doctrine should apply by considering 
what constitutes a reasonable amount of time within 
which it would be expected that a plaintiff should have 
moved for class certification.  We also consider a few 
additional arguments that have been made more recently 
in support of the picking off exception.  This will help us 
to determine infra whether and how the exception should 
apply in this case. 
 While Campbell-Ewald, as mentioned above, does 
not actually address the picking off exception, we see in 
it some support for the principles animating the exception 
in the Court’s discussion of class action standing.  
Specifically, the Court noted that while a class does not 
become an independent entity until certification, “a 
would-be class representative with a live claim of her 
own must be accorded a fair opportunity to show that 
certification is warranted.”  136 S. Ct. at 672.  This 
                                                 
5 Crucially, in doing so we must still determine whether 
Richardson “undu[ly] delay[ed]” presenting the issue of 
class certification to the District Court—a requirement 
the plaintiff satisfied in Weiss.  Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348.  
That issue is discussed in Part B below. 
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statement seems to suggest a corollary: when a would-be 
class representative is not given a “fair opportunity” to 
show that certification is warranted (perhaps because her 
individual claim became moot before she could 
reasonably have been expected to file for class 
certification), she should be permitted to continue 
seeking class certification for some period of time after 
her claim has become moot. 
 Without this “fair opportunity,” there would be, as 
we explained in Weiss, a race between the plaintiff and 
the defendant to see who could act first—the plaintiff in 
moving for class certification or the defendant in mooting 
the claims of would-be class representatives.  Such a race 
would often thwart proper factual development of class 
action claims and thus prevent courts from fully and 
fairly assessing the merits of class certification.  Cf. Yaffe 
v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972) (“To 
pronounce finally, prior to allowing any discovery, the 
non-existence of a class or set of subclasses, when their 
existence may depend on information wholly within 
defendants’ ken, seems precipitate and contrary to the 
pragmatic spirit of Rule 23.”). 
 Indeed, we have seen this exact problem arising in 
district courts across the country.  Plaintiffs increasingly 
file so-called “placeholder” motions for class 
certification solely to prevent defendants from mooting 
the claims of would-be class representatives.  See, e.g., 
Wasvary v. WB Holdings, LLC, No. 15-10750, 2015 WL 
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5161370, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2015); Church v. 
Accretive Health, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 676, 679 (S.D. Ala. 
2014); Beaudry v. Telecheck Servs., Inc., No. 3:07-CV-
0842, 2010 WL 2901781, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 20, 
2010).  These placeholder motions “come[] with a cost,” 
as, they 
burden[] the Court with an obviously 
premature motion that is devoid of content 
and the motion remains on the Court’s 
docket as pending, which is reflected on the 
Court’s reports for an unspecified period of 
time.  See [Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 
299 F.R.D. 676,] 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
56939 at *3 (“Plaintiff’s straight-out-of-the-
chute Rule 23 Motion is highly unlikely to 
advance her cause one iota, but is virtually 
certain to impose administrative costs, 
unnecessary distractions, and an unhelpful 
drag on efficiency and judicial economy.”). 
Dickerson v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 8:14-cv-1390-T-
30TBM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100323 (M.D. Fla. July 
23, 2014).  Our ruling today is intended to have the 
salutary effect of discouraging these premature motions 
in favor of motions brought within a reasonable period of 
time and after proper factual development of the claims 
has occurred.  This is so because a plaintiff, by waiting 
until it would be appropriate to seek class certification, 
 25 
 
does not run the risk of having the entire class action 
mooted in the interim. 
 Indeed, Weiss has already had this beneficial effect 
in some of the district courts in this Circuit.  See Smith v. 
Interline Brands, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 701, 701-03 
(D.N.J. 2014) (denying a premature motion for class 
certification and explaining that after Weiss, waiting to 
seek class certification until the facts are fully developed 
will not expose the would-be class representative to a 
premature mootness challenge).  Smith also noted that 
our approach in Weiss “is a sensible recognition of the 
undesirability of a premature motion for class 
certification, unsupported by discovery and largely 
untethered to the requirements for actually certifying a 
class.”  Id. at 703.  We could not agree more.6 
                                                 
6 In the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where this case 
was filed, Local Rule 23.3 requires the filing of a motion 
for class certification within ninety days of the complaint.  
While neither side raised arguments concerning this rule 
on appeal, we take this occasion to note that a strict time 
limitation like the one imposed by Local Rule 23.3 “may 
be inconsistent with Rule 23(c)(1)(A)’s emphasis on the 
parties’ obligation to present the court with sufficient 
information to support an informed decision on 
certification.  Parties need sufficient time to develop an 
adequate record.”  Ann. Manual Complex Lit. § 21.133 
(4th ed.).  Further, Local Rule 23.3 may conflict with this 
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 Other circuits have recently been moving in this 
same direction.  In Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., for 
example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the relation 
back doctrine should be extended to situations in which a 
defendant could “‘buy off’ the small individual claims of 
the named plaintiffs,”  653 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 
2011), because such claims are “acutely susceptible to 
mootness.”  Id. (quoting Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347).  If such 
an exception to mootness were not adopted, Pitts 
explained, “[i]t would effectively ensure that claims that 
are too economically insignificant to be brought on their 
own would never have their day in court.”  Id. at 1091.  
The effect would be to broadly undermine the purpose of 
Rule 23 and class action litigation.  Cf. Stewart v. Cheek 
& Zeehandelar, LLP, 252 F.R.D. 384, 386 (S.D. Ohio 
2008) (“[T]reating pre-certification settlement offers as 
mooting the named plaintiffs’ claims would have the 
disastrous effect of enabling defendants to essentially 
opt-out of Rule 23.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)).  The court in Pitts therefore held that a 
named plaintiff’s claim could relate back to the date of 
filing the class action complaint.  653 F.3d at 1092.   
                                                                                                             
Court’s recognition—as reflected in the change to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(1)(A)—that 
class certification questions should not be hastily raised 
or resolved. 
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 The Eleventh Circuit has also taken this approach.  
In Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd. Partnership, the court 
recognized that it was bound by Zeidman (the Fifth 
Circuit’s7 1981 opinion adopting the picking off 
exception) and held that the picking off exception to 
mootness should apply when defendants are able 
“‘effectively to prevent any plaintiff in the class from 
procuring a decision on class certification.’”  772 F.3d 
698, 706 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Zeidman, 651 F.2d at 
1050).   
 Stein also concluded that “nothing . . . suggests the 
relation-back doctrine turns on whether the named 
party’s individual claims become moot before or after the 
plaintiffs move to certify a class.  Quite the contrary.”  
Id. at 707.  Stein then explained that in class action 
litigation, in no way does “the filing of a certification 
motion, rather than the entry of a certification order, 
affect[] legal rights.”  Id. at 708.  Indeed, Stein further 
held that the motion itself “does nothing significant” and 
merely “indicates that the named plaintiff intends to 
represent a class if allowed to so do,” something that a 
class action complaint also does.  Id. at 707.  Thus, it is 
erroneous for courts to conclude that the filing of the 
                                                 
7 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to 
October 1, 1981, are precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.  
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 
(11th Cir.1981) (en banc). 
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class certification motion somehow “fundamentally 
changes the legal landscape” of the case.  Id. 
 Stein instead concluded that the focus should be on 
whether “the named plaintiff acts diligently to pursue the 
class claims.”  Id.  What constitutes “diligence” in each 
case may vary, but Stein concluded that it was sufficient 
to simply state that if a plaintiff “acts without undue 
delay” seeking class certification, relation back is 
permissible.  Id.  And because it concluded that the filing 
of the class certification motion should lack legal 
significance, Stein held that when the relation back 
doctrine applies, “certification relates back not to the 
filing of the motion to certify but to the filing of the 
complaint.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 The Tenth Circuit has similarly held that the 
relation back doctrine may be applied to relate a now-
moot individual claim back to the date of the class action 
complaint.  In Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, 
Inc., the court adopted a narrow formulation of this rule, 
holding that when “satisfaction of the plaintiff’s 
individual claim [occurs] before the court can reasonably 
be expected to rule on the class certification motion,” the 
plaintiff’s stake in the litigation is not extinguished.  639 
F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011).  Indeed, Lucero 
adopted reasoning similar to that in Stein when it 
explained that “[w]e find no authority on which to 
distinguish the case in which a class certification motion 
is pending or filed within the duration of the offer of 
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judgment from our case [in which no motion has yet been 
filed]: any Article III interest a class may or may not 
have in a case is or is not present from its inception.”  Id. 
at 1250. 
 Based primarily on Weiss, but also upon 
consideration of the well-reasoned approaches of our 
sister circuits, we reaffirm the validity of the picking off 
exception.  When an individual plaintiff’s claim for relief 
is acutely susceptible to mootness and it is clear from the 
complaint that the plaintiff is seeking to represent a class, 
we may relate such a claim back to the date of the filing 
of the class complaint. 
 That said, our holding should not be read to give 
plaintiffs a free pass to delay the determination of class 
status.  As Lucero noted, this mootness exception should 
apply only in situations where the mooting of the 
individual claim “occurred at so early a point in litigation 
that the named plaintiff could not have been expected to 
file a class certification motion.”  639 F.3d at 1249 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  If, on 
the other hand, “the plaintiff had ample time to file the 
class certification motion,” this exception should not 
apply and “courts [should] adhere to the general rule that 
the mooting of named plaintiff’s claim prior to class 
certification moots the entire case.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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B. 
 We now address whether the mooting of 
Richardson’s individual claim occurred “at so early a 
point in litigation” that his failure to file a motion for 
class certification was not unreasonable.  Id.  In making 
this determination, we are mindful of two separate but 
related considerations.  Weiss explained that plaintiffs 
cannot “undu[ly] delay” seeking class certification, 385 
F.3d at 348, while Campbell-Ewald suggested that 
plaintiffs must still have a “fair opportunity” to seek class 
certification, 136 S. Ct. at 672. 
i. 
 We begin by considering whether Richardson was 
given a fair opportunity to present the issue of class 
certification to the District Court before he was 
transferred out of the SMU program.  Fortunately, for 
purposes of this case, we need not determine the outer 
bounds of what might constitute a “fair opportunity” to 
seek class certification because the facts of this case 
make it clear that Richardson was not given such an 
opportunity. 8  Richardson was transferred out of USP 
                                                 
8 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit grappled 
with what might constitute the outer bounds of a “fair 
opportunity” in Clark v. State Farm, explaining that 
“when the defendant makes a full offer of judgement—
thereby mooting the named plaintiff’s claims—at so early 
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Lewisburg’s SMU program a mere six weeks after he 
filed his amended complaint; this is much shorter than 
the 90 days allowed by Local Rule 23.3 (which may 
itself, as we explained in the margin, be too short), and is 
the same amount of time Weiss was given to seek 
certification before his claim was mooted.9  Thus, 
                                                                                                             
a point in the litigation that the named plaintiff could not 
have been expected to file a class certification motion, 
the class’s claims are not moot and the case may proceed.  
But where the plaintiff has had ample time to file the 
class certification motion, district courts adhere to the 
general rule that the mooting of a named plaintiff’s claim 
prior to class certification moots the entire case.”  Clark 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1134, 1139 
(10th Cir. 2009).  In Clark, however, the court did not 
need to decide whether it would adopt our approach in 
Weiss.  It held that even under Weiss, Clark’s claim 
would be moot as he delayed seeking class certification 
for two years after the case was remanded to the district 
court. 
9 In Weiss, we held that the plaintiff had not unduly 
delayed seeking class certification because his claim was 
mooted a mere six weeks after he filed his complaint.  
385 F.3d at 348 n.18.  As discussed further in this Part, 
the corollary of this conclusion is that Weiss had not 
exhausted his fair opportunity to seek class certification 
in the six weeks he had been given. 
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whatever the outer bounds may be, it is clear that if a 
defendant acts to moot a would-be class representative’s 
claim within six weeks of the filing of a class action 
complaint, that plaintiff did not have a fair opportunity to 
present his case for class certification to the District 
Court.  We will accordingly relate his claim back to the 
date on which the amended class complaint was filed.  
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348. 
ii. 
 We take care to note that the concept of a “fair 
opportunity” is bounded by the admonition from Weiss 
mentioned above: that a plaintiff must present the issue 
of class certification to the District Court without “undue 
delay.”  Id.  Such delay would prevent relation back to 
the date of the complaint.  Id. 
 The contours of this undue delay standard have yet 
to be fleshed out.  In Weiss, as mentioned earlier, the 
would-be class representative only had six weeks to 
move for class certification.  By holding that there was 
no undue delay, we implicitly suggested that there had 
also not been a fair opportunity to seek class certification 
before the case became moot and thus instructed the trial 
court on remand to permit Weiss to file a motion for class 
certification.  Id. 
 This concept of undue delay was also discussed by 
the Fifth Circuit under similar circumstances in Sandoz v. 
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Cingular Wireless LLC,  553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2008).  
Sandoz filed a class action complaint against Cingular 
Wireless in state court.  Twenty-four days after the case 
was removed to federal court, Cingular made a Rule 68 
offer of judgment and then sought to dismiss the case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The district court 
concluded that the Rule 68 offer did not moot the entire 
case and denied the motion to dismiss.  The case was 
taken up on interlocutory appeal, and the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that application of the relation back doctrine 
was appropriate.  Unlike the situation in Weiss, however, 
“Sandoz did not file her motion to certify until thirteen 
months after she filed her complaint, and relation back is 
warranted only when the plaintiff files for certification 
‘without undue delay.’”  Id. at 921 (quoting Weiss, 385 
F.3d at 348).  The court therefore concluded that “[o]n 
remand, the district court must determine, under these 
unique facts, whether Sandoz timely sought certification 
of her collective action.  If she did, then her motion 
relates back to the filing of her initial state court 
petition.”  Id.10 
                                                 
10 On remand, the district court held that “[i]n sum, 
between the time defendants answered the petition and 
made their offer of judgment, the litigation has been 
embroiled in the single issue of whether defendants' offer 
of judgment mooted the plaintiff’s claim and/or mooted 
the entire litigation.  After that issue was preliminarily 
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 Unfortunately, applying this “undue delay” 
analysis to the facts of our case presents an added 
challenge.  Typically, when determining whether the 
plaintiff has unduly delayed, we measure the time 
between the filing of the complaint (or amended 
complaint) and the filing of the motion for class 
certification.  Richardson, however, never filed a motion 
for class certification.  We hold that that is of no moment 
here.  His failure to file a motion for class certification 
does not prevent relation back because the issue was 
clearly presented to the District Court without undue 
delay. 
 Two weeks after Richardson filed his amended 
complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
entire case.  In this motion, Defendants argued, among 
other things, that Richardson could not meet the four 
requirements for class certification listed in Rule 23(a).  
Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 26, ECF No. 28.  Richardson 
responded to this motion one month later, reiterating the 
arguments he made earlier in his amended complaint 
regarding class certification and explaining why the 
                                                                                                             
resolved by this court, prior to appeal, plaintiff timely 
filed her motion for certification as instructed by the 
District Judge.  Under these circumstances, it would be a 
miscarriage of justice to conclude that plaintiff’s motion 
for class certification was filed untimely.”  Sandoz, 2009 
WL 2370643, at *4. 
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proposed class meets all the requirements of Rule 23(a).  
Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 29, ECF No. 33.  
Defendants’ motion and Richardson’s response thus put 
the issue of class certification squarely before the District 
Court.11  There was no need for Plaintiff to file a separate 
motion seeking class certification.  Richardson’s 
amended complaint made it clear that he was seeking 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss recognized that fact.  Indeed, the District Court 
concluded that the issue of class certification was 
properly presented—a determination to which we give 
substantial deference—because it considered and denied 
class certification based only on the class action 
complaint, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and 
Richardson’s response.12 
                                                 
11 Although Richardson had yet to file a written motion 
for class certification, the record reveals curious 
references which Defendants’ have failed to explain.  
Specifically, their motion to dismiss mentioned a 
nonexistent “motion” by Richardson for class 
certification at least twice.  Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 25, 32,  
ECF No. 28. 
12 The District Court cited the amended complaint when 
it stated that Richardson had moved for class certification 
pursuant to Rule 23.  Kane, 2013 WL 1452962, at *1.  
While the amended complaint did explain that 
Richardson sought to represent a class of similarly 
situated individuals and asked for class certification in its 
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  We agree that, ordinarily, the “proper procedure is 
for the named representative to file a motion for class 
certification.”  Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348.  Yet the absence 
of a motion should not necessarily be fatal.  Accordingly, 
we join the courts of appeals which have held that 
“[n]othing in the plain language of Rule 23(c)(1)(A) 
either vests plaintiffs with the exclusive right to put the 
class certification issue before the district court or 
prohibits a defendant from seeking early resolution of the 
class certification question.”  Vinole v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2009); 
see also Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 
34, 59 (1st Cir. 2013); Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, 
LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 949 (6th Cir. 2011).  We embrace the 
view that “[t]he only requirement [in Rule 23(c)(1)(A)] is 
that the certification question be resolved ‘[a]t an early 
practicable time.’”  Vinole, 571 F.3d at 940 (quoting Rule 
23(c)(1)(A)).  There is no per se rule that a plaintiff must 
move for class certification before the issue can be 
considered by the District Court.  However, “[t]o say that 
a defendant may freely move for resolution of the class-
                                                                                                             
prayer for relief, it did not by itself constitute, nor did it 
include, a motion for class certification.  Richardson too 
recognized that he had yet to file a motion for class 
certification when he later explained that he was waiting 
to file the motion until his earlier motion to consolidate 
his case with Shelton was considered.  Pl.’s Resp. to 
Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 28, ECF No. 33. 
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certification question whenever it wishes does not free 
the district court from the duty of engaging in a rigorous 
analysis of the question . . . .”  Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 949 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, “a court 
should typically await the development of a factual 
record before determining whether the case should move 
forward on a representative basis.”  Manning, 725 F.3d at 
59.   
 We also believe that permitting either party to raise 
the issue of class certification strikes the proper balance 
between permitting prompt and efficient judicial 
resolution of cases in which “we cannot see how 
discovery or for that matter more time would have 
helped” the named plaintiff, Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 949, 
and ensuring that district courts allow for the factual 
development that is often necessary to determine the 
propriety of class certification.  Because a district court 
must have the freedom to balance these interests, we 
conclude that a per se rule requiring the plaintiff to move 
for certification is improper. 
 Applying these principles to this case, it is clear 
that even though Richardson never filed a motion to 
certify the class, certification was still squarely presented 
to and properly considered by the District Court.13  Both 
                                                 
13 We also note that the District Court applied the proper 
standard in evaluating the certification question even 
though the motion was styled as a motion to dismiss.  As 
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sides briefed the issue and explained why they believed 
the class should or should not be certified.  And again, as 
discussed above, the argument that the mere filing of a 
motion for class certification somehow alters the “legal 
landscape” of the case “makes no sense” when it is 
already clear from the complaint alone that the plaintiff is 
seeking such relief.  Stein, 772 F.3d at 707.  We therefore 
hold that the District Court did not err in considering the 
merits of class certification absent an affirmative motion 
by Richardson. 
 For purposes of determining undue delay, we can 
thus read Defendants’ motion to dismiss and 
Richardson’s response as sufficiently presenting the issue 
of class certification to the District Court.  Because the 
issue was both raised by Defendants and responded to by 
Richardson within seven weeks of the filing of the 
amended complaint, we cannot conclude that Richardson 
                                                                                                             
we have held before, “the Rule 23 requirements differ in 
kind from legal rulings under Rule 12(b)(6).”  In re 
Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 303 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  A 
motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, 
but “[b]y contrast, an order certifying a class usually is 
the district judge’s last word on the subject; there is no 
later test of the decision’s factual premises.”  Szabo v. 
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
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unduly delayed presenting the issue of class certification 
to the District Court even though he never filed a motion 
for class certification. 
iii. 
 Our analysis can be summed up as follows.  First, 
Richardson did not have a “fair opportunity” to seek class 
certification before his individual claim became moot 
because Defendants transferred Richardson out of the 
SMU Program six weeks after he filed his amended class 
action complaint.  In other words, he could not be 
expected to have presented the class certification issue to 
the District Court within that amount of time.  Second, 
because the class certification question was both raised 
by Defendants and responded to by Richardson within 
seven weeks of the filing of the amended class complaint, 
we excuse Richardson’s failure to file a motion for class 
certification as the issue was squarely presented to the 
District Court without undue delay.  Accordingly, under 
Weiss, we can relate the District Court’s denial of class 
certification back to the date of Richardson’s amended 
class complaint.14  Because Richardson’s individual 
                                                 
14 We are not presented with a situation in which no class 
members, named or otherwise, currently have standing to 
seek relief in this case.  Defendants have not alleged that 
the SMU program at Lewisburg has been shut down.  We 
must therefore assume that the program is still active and 
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claims for injunctive relief were live at the time he filed 
this complaint, the subsequent mooting of these claims 
does not prevent Richardson from continuing to seek 
class certification or from serving as the class 
representative.15 
III. 
 Defendants also argue that this case is moot 
because the prison officials Richardson seeks to enjoin 
are no longer employed at USP Lewisburg.  Defendants 
thus attempt to analogize this case to Spomer v. Littleton, 
arguing that Richardson has not alleged that the 
supposedly unconstitutional practices at USP Lewisburg 
would continue under a new administration.  414 U.S. at 
520-21.  Defendants are correct that, in light of Spomer, 
Richardson had to plead more than a mere “personal” 
grievance against individuals at the prison in order to 
avoid the mooting of his claims for injunctive relief.  
Richardson instead had to allege that his grievances were 
                                                                                                             
that unnamed class members still have live claims to 
assert. 
15 On remand, therefore, the District Court may consider 
the additional class certification requirements that it did 
not previously reach when it erroneously concluded that 
the class was unascertainable.  It may also reconsider 
whether consolidation with Shelton is appropriate.  In 
making these determinations, the District Court may 
order supplemental briefing as it sees fit. 
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systematic, pervasive, or institutional and thus likely to 
continue under a new prison administration.  Our review 
shows that Richardson has made sufficient allegations 
that—at least at the motion to dismiss stage—will 
prevent a mootness determination under Spomer. 
 As we have previously explained, even when “a 
substitution of successors in office is procedurally sound, 
to obtain injunctive relief against the successor there 
must be some indication that the successor would 
otherwise continue the unconstitutional practices alleged 
in the complaint.”  Sarteschi v. Burlein, 508 F.2d 110, 
114 (3d Cir. 1975).  In other words, the question we must 
ask under Spomer and Sarteschi is “whether the alleged 
violation is personal to the departed official or whether it 
reflects a continuing state practice.”  Peck v. McDaniel, 
No. 2:12-cv-01495, 2014 WL 6747115, at *5 (D. Nev. 
Dec 1, 2014). 
 This approach is also supported by the 
commentary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d),16 
                                                 
16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) states in relevant 
part: 
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which permits such substitutions.  Specifically, the 
Advisory Committee explains that “[i]n general [Rule 
25(d)] will apply whenever effective relief would call for 
corrective behavior by the one then having official status 
and power, rather than one who has lost that status and 
power through ceasing to hold office.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 
advisory committee notes to 1937 adoption.  If a practice 
is ongoing and “institutional,” the relevant defendant is 
the one who has the power to stop it. 
 In this case, Defendants argue that because the 
unconstitutional actions alleged in the amended 
complaint are characterized as being in violation of BOP 
policy, the conduct must be personal to Defendants.  
They argue that “Richardson’s amended complaint is 
devoid of any allegation that the current Director of the 
Bureau of Prisons, the Warden of USP Lewisburg, and 
his new associate wardens would violate inmates’ 
constitutional rights by blatantly disregarding prison 
                                                                                                             
An action does not abate when a public 
officer who is a party in an official capacity 
dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold 
office while the action is pending.  The 
officer’s successor is automatically 
substituted as a party.  Later proceedings 
should be in the substituted party’s name, 
but any misnomer not affecting the parties’ 
substantial rights must be disregarded. 
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policy and subjecting inmates to harm.”  Appellees’ Br. 
23.  In response, Richardson argues that “Spomer is 
inapplicable to the case at bar as Mr. Richardson’s 
allegations do not relate to the personal conduct of the 
named defendants, but rather to facts concerning 
institutional practices and policies.”  Appellant’s Reply 
Br. 15. 
 While Richardson does allege that conduct at issue 
violated BOP policy, this does not necessarily mean that 
the conduct was idiosyncratic or limited to the personal 
hostility of a particular individual.  Instead, the amended 
complaint alleges that there was an unspoken practice or 
procedure of retribution in the prison, which is more akin 
to an “institutional practice,” as the Ninth Circuit 
determined in Hoptowit v. Spellman.  753 F.2d 779, 782 
(9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the claims did “not relate 
to the personal conduct of the principal named 
defendants” but “concern[ed] institutional practices and 
physical conditions at the penitentiary”). 
 In particular, right from the beginning of his 
amended complaint, Richardson asserts that the injuries 
here are the result of a “pattern, practice, or policy,” and 
then refers to the constitutional violations he is alleging 
as “systematic failure[s]” at USP Lewisburg.  Pl.’s Am. 
Compl. 2, 3.  We, of course, take no position on whether 
Richardson can succeed in showing that this practice has 
in fact continued under the new prison administration.  
We simply hold that “[t]his is enough for the complaint 
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not to be dismissed,” and caution just as we did in 
Sarteschi that—should future developments in this case 
show that the alleged abuses are in fact no longer 
occurring at USP Lewisburg—“it would be appropriate, 
upon proper motion by defendants, to enter judgment in 
favor of [Defendants].”  508 F.2d at 114. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order dismissing Richardson’s class 
claims and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
